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Abstract 
Impacts  of agricultural and nonagricultural trade  libe~alization on 
agriculture are assessed in a  multi-commodity,  multi-country  framework.  By 
modeling  simultaneously all goods  sectors  of  the  economy,  we  evaluate the 
importance  of  (1)  relative price changes  between sectors  and  (2)  income  and 
exchange  rate adjustments  that follow trade liberalization in a  world  of 
floating  rates. 
Specifically,  we  compare  two  cases using  a  static world policy simulation 
(SWOPSIM)  model:  agricultural multilateral liberalization and  complete 
multilateral liberalization with floating  exchange rates for all 
countries/region.  In both cases agricultural commodity prices  tend to 
increase,  an effect which is more  pronounced when  currency values  adjust.  The 
developing  countries,  in particular Argentina,  Brazil,  and  Mexico,  have  the 
most  significant advances  in agricultural  and total domestic  product when 
exchange  rates vary.  Morever,  the gains  from  international trade are  extended 
to all countries/regions explicitly specified in the model. AGRICULTURAL  TRADE  LIBERALIZATION  IN  A MULTI-SECTOR  WORLD  MODEL 
I.  Introduction 
The  United States and  other members  of the General  Agreement  on Tariffs and 
Trade  (GATT)  are participating in an  eighth round  of multilateral trade 
negotiations  (MTN)  in which resolving agricultural issues is a  top priority. 
The  importance  of agriculture in these negotiations  is related to current 
problems  in the international agricultural trade  enviroTh~ent.  Although many 
factors  account  for  adverse agricultural market  conditions,  the agricultural 
policies of trading countries are thought  to be  important  contributors  to 
mounting  surpluses,  falling  commodity prices,  and  declining levels of world 
trade values  in the eighties.  Trade barriers,  price and  income  support 
programs,  and  other domestic agricultural policies buffer agricultural 
producers  in many  countries  from world price movements  and  discourage  supply 
adjustments. 
Most  analyses  of agricultural protectionism have  been  conducted  in a  partial 
equilibrium framework.  For example,  the  OECD  (1987)  and  World  Bank  (Tyers  and 
Anderson,  1986;  World  Bank,  1986)  studies  examine  a  liberalization in a 
multi-agricultural commodity model  but do  not consider nonagricultural 
sectors.  Yet  a  reduction in protection for the nonagricultural sector can 
cause  changes  in nonagricultural  and agricultural prices,  changes  in income, 
and  changes  in relative prices across  countries via exchange rate movements. 
This  would  influence resource allocations across  sectors  and  countries  and 
thereby affect agricultural production,  consumption,  and  trade.  The 
nonagricultural  component  of  the economy  may  have  even more  influence than 
sector-specific policies. In view of  the potential importance  of  a  broad-based  framework,  we  develop  a 
multi-commodity,  multi-country static model  and  attempt to assess  the effects 
of  complete  (agricultural  and nonagricultural)  trade liberalization on  the 
agricultural sector.  By  modeling all goods  sectors of  the economy,  we  are 
able to  compare  a  total trade liberalization scenario  in which  exchange  rates 
are endogenous  with  a  scenario  in which  only agricultural trade is liberalized 
and  there are  assumed  to be no  exchange rate changes. 
To  undertake the scenarios,  we  use  a  static world policy simulation model 
(SWOPSIM)  (Roningen,  1986;  Dixit and  Roningen,  1986)  which  includes eight 
countries/regions  (United States,  European  Community,  Japan,  Canada, 
A~gentina, Brazil,  Mexico,  and  rest-of-world  (ROW)]  and  a  breakdown of 
commodities  for each country into agricultural goods  (wheat,  corn,  soybeans, 
rice,  sugar,  dairy,  beef  and poultry),  a  composite  "other" agricultural  good, 
a  composite nonagricultural traded good  and  a  nontraded  good.  A base  level 
(1984)  is established for demand  and  supply,  consumer prices,  producer prices, 
and world prices.  For each country producer and  consumer prices  (or the 
implicit per unit values)  deviate  from world price by  an  ad  valorem rate of 
protection.  The  levels  of  government  intervention in agriculture are measured 
by producer  and  consumer  subsidy equivalents  (USDA,  1987).  For 
nonagricultural goods,  ad  valorem tariff and nontariff barrier 
tariff-equivalent rates are used for protection measures  (Whalley,  1985,  1986; 
Deardorff  and  Stern,  1986;  Anjaria et al.,  1985). 
II.  Analytical  Framework 
The  framework  for this analysis has  its origins  in studies by Valdez  (1985) 
and  Deardorff  and  Stern  (1986).  We  set up  a  "more  complete" partial 
equilibrium model  with all produced and  consumed  goods  specified in demand  and 
2 supply functions.  The  model  falls short of  a  general equilibrium 
characterization since factor markets  are not explicitly described. 
Our  approach has  the advantage  over agricultural sector models  of  accounting 
for  feedback  from  one  sector to another as  relative prices alter. 
Additionally,  because all goods  in the  economy  are accounted for  (and hence, 
the total balance of  trade),  income  and  exchange rates  can be modeled 
endogenously  and  the effect of  floating rates  (or exchange  rate 
liberalization)  can be evaluated. 
The  model  is developed  for m countries/regions,  i  = 1  to m,  producing  and 
trading n  goods,  j  = 1  to n,  and  producing additionally a  nontraded good,  k. 
The  traded  goods  include  a  breakdown  of agricultural  goods  (1, ... ,n-2),  a 
composite "other agricultural"  good  (j  = n-l) ,  and  a  composite nonagricultural 
good  (j  = n). 
The  demand  and  supply functions,  assumed  to  be  derived  from  consumer  and 
producer maximizing behavior,  depend  on all prices  and  income  as  delineated 
below: 
DAij  = DAijePAij,  PTin,  PHik,  Yi)  (1) 
DTin  = DTin(PAij,  PTin,  PHik,  Yi)  (2) 
DHik  = DHik (P  Aij ,  PTin,  PHik.  Yi)  (3) 
SAij  = SAij (PAij,  PTin,  PHik)  (4) 
STin = STin(PAij,  PTin,  PHik)  (5) 
SHik  = SHik(PAij,  PTin,  PHik)  (6) 
where  D and  S  are demand  and  supply equations,  respectively,  P  are prices,  Y 
is  income,  A denotes  agricultural goods,  T represents the nonagricultural 
3 traded products  either exported or  imported,  and  H represents  the nontraded 
good.  Farm  input prices are  included implicitly in the price of 
nonagricultural  goods  faced  by agricultural producers;  likewise,  agricultural 
prices represent both prices of  inputs  and prices of  alternative outputs  to 
nonagricultural producers. 
Income  is defined to equal total absorption: 
n 
Yi  =~PijDij + PikDik. 
j=l 
(7) 
Alternatively,  income  equals  the value of production plus  (minus)  foreign 
borrowing. 
The  domestic  economy  reaches  an  equilibrium when  home  goods  have  an  excess 
supply equal to  0  and  when  net traded  goods  (including agricultural goods) 
equal "net capital flows"  (F).  F  is defined as  including capital  and  service 
accounts  and  accommodating  changes  in international reserves.  For  country i, 
ESHik  = SHik  - DHik  =  a 
and 
n 
~ESij  = 
j=1 
n  n 
~Sij  - ~Dij  = F 
j=l  j=l 
(8) 
(9) 
World  markets  clear when  excess  supply of  a  geod  across all countries is equal 




m  m 
rSAij  - ~DAij  =  a 
i=1  i=1 
(10) 
for each j, j  =  1  to n  - 1.  For  the nonagricultural good  that is traded,  n, 




m  m 
= rSTin  - ~DTin =  a 
i=1  i=1 
(11) 
4 The  traded price in each country's home  currency is 
PTij  = Ei  PWTj  (12) 
where  Ei  equals  home  currency per u.s.  dollar,  PWTj  is the world dollar price 
of  good  j  for all traded j's. 
Various  government policies  can place a  wedge  between the world price of  a 
traded  good  and  the domestic price or  implied per unit value  of that good.  (In 
the·model,  we  assume  no  changes  in transportation costs  and margin markups.) 
Consider  the possibility that the home  country affects  traded prices  (prices 
faced  by producers  and  consumers)  by either imposing  an  ad  valorem subsidy or 
tax on exports or imports.  This  has  the effect of modifying  equation  (12)  to 
PTij  =  Ei  PWTj  (1  + tij)  (13) 
where tij can be  interpreted as  an  export  subsidy or import tariff (tij  >  0), 
or export tax or import  subsidy (tij  <  0)  and  is assumed  to be  exogenous.  If 
the home  country wants  to  encourage  (discourage)  exports,  they can subsidize 
(tax)  exports  implying  t  >  0  (t <  0).  If the home  country  wants  to  discourage 
(encourage)  imports,  they can tax  (subsidize)  imports  implying  t  >  0  (t <  0). 
A shock to the system--in terms  of  a  change  in protection in either sector of 
the  economy,  in any country or commodity market--leads  to  changes  from base 
values  in quantities produced,  consumed,  and  traded and world and  domestic 
prices.  The  system also determines either  (1)  changes  in each country's 
balance of trade under the  assumption of fixed  exchange rates  and  the 
availability of external financing or  (2)  changes  in each country's  exchange 
rate under  the  ass~~ption of  floating rates which return all countries'  trade 
balances  to their initial equilibria.  Thus,  in the  second  case,  we  are 
assuming  that changes  in trade protection can change  currency values  depending on  the elasticities of  demand  and  supply for  traded and nontraded goods. 
Since the elasticities approach does  not  consider a  world with capital flows, 
we  are implicitly assuming  that the  shock effects only  the trade balance  and 
does not  induce  changes  in capital flows.  Corden  (1987)  argues  that the 
capital account  depends  on  savings  and  investment decisions  and it is 
ambiguous  whether there would  be  a  capital flows  effect with  implementation or 
removal  of protection measures.  While  we  could have arbitrarily selected to 
limit the  change  in the trade balance so  that it did not  always  equal  zero, 
there is no  rigorous criteria to  do  so. 
Through  a  series of differentiations and  substitutions  (see Appendix),  we  can 
obtain an expression for  changes  in the balance of  trade  (which  equals  changes 
in net capital outflows)  in terms  of  changes  in protection and  exchange rate 
policies,  and  changes  in world prices  of both agricultural and nonagricultural 
traded goods: 
(IT1  +  IT2)E*  +  IT1  [PWA*  +  (1  +  tA)*)  (14) 
+  IT2  [PWT*  +  (1  +  tT)*)  = F* 
where  the *'s indicate percentage changes  in the variables  and  the n's are 
parameters  consisting of  supply and  demand  elasticities, sector expenditure 
shares,  and  the shares  of agriculture and nonagriculture in trade. 
Under  a  fixed exchange rate system,  E*=O,  the balance of trade changes  in 
response  to  changes  in protection in the agriculture and nonagriculture 
sectors  and  changes  in the world prices of  traded goods.  External  financing 
is assumed  to be  forthcoming  to balance the change  in the value  of net trade. 
Trade policy changes  do  not directly influence capital flows,  but  do  so 
6 indirectly in order to balance the trade account. II  In the small  country 
case agricultural markets  would  be affected  (a)  directly by  changes  in the 
country's agricultural protection,  (b)  indirectly by  changes  in prices  of 
nonagricultural and nontraded  goods  resulting  from  changes  in the country's 
nonagricultural protection,  and  (c)  by  gains  in income  resulting  from 
liberalization.  In the large country case,  the'additional effects of  changes 
in world prices  feed  back  to  domestic prices  and  affect domestic  production 
and  consumption,  and  consequently,  trade. 
Under  a  floating  exchange rate system,  the country's  currency would  depreciate 
or appreciate following  liberalization until the  changes  in the external 
imbalance  are eliminated,  that is, until F*=O.  Hence,  the exchange  rate 
change  causes  a  further feedback  from world prices  to  domestic prices  and 
subsequent adjustments  to quantities. 
If the parameters  of  equation  (14),  IT1  and  IT2,  are positive,  then a 
reduction  in protection leads  to  a  depreciation of  the exchange  rate which 
offsets,  to  some  extent,  the negative  impacts  on  domestic prices of  a 
reduction  in protection levels.  If the agricultural protection levels are 
initially negative  (for example,  most  agricultural  commodities  in Argentina) 
and nonagricultural protection is initially positive,  then a  reduction of 
protection can lead to  a  depreciation which would  reinforce the positive 
effects of  liberalization on domestic agricultural prices. 
II Trade policy changes  do  not directly influence capital flows,  but  do  so 
indirectly in order to balance the trade account. 
7 The  appendix differentiates  the entire system of  equations  and  derives  reduced 
form equations  for prices and  exchange rates  in terms  of  the exogenous 
variables,  protection in the agricultural  and  nonagricultural sectors. 
III.  Simulation Results 
Although there are many  alternative scenarios  which  we  could have  simulated, 
we  chose  two  cases:  (1)  a  100  percent multilateral liberalization of 
agriculture for all countries under.  the assumption of  fixed  exchange  rates  for 
all countries/regions  in the model  and  (2)  a  100 percent multilateral 
liberalization of all sectors for all countries under the assumption of 
endogenous  exchange  rates for all countries/regions  in the model.  £/ 
These  scenarios were  designed not to predict actual  outcomes  of  trade 
negotiations,  but to explore the bias in agricultural trade liberalization 
analyses  which  do  not account  for  cross-sector linkages,  income,  or exchange 
rate effects due  to  changes  in protection. 
In tables  1  and  2,  we  report selected results focusing  on  the effects of 
liberalization on world agricultural prices  and  volumes,  exchange  rates,  and 
trade.  In table 3,  we  present a  measure  of  economic well being -- domestic 
£/  The  model  developed  in the analytical section and  described further  in 
the appendix is more  appropriately suited for  changes  of  small  magnitudes. 
However,  we  opted for large liberalization shocks,  albeit small prices  changes 
occurred  for most  commodities.  The  difficulty in undertaking  a  less  than 
complete  liberalization for  each  commodity brings up  a  problem regarding  the 
resulting price transmission.  A 50 percent reduction of  a  subsidy equivalent, 
for  instance,  does  not tell us  whether the policy distorting  instrument has 
changed  also.  Thus,  the price transmission may  remain  ambiguous.  With 


















Table l--Changes  in World  Agricultural Prices  and  Volume 
(percent change) 
Prices  Volume 
Case  1  Case  2  Case  1  Case  2 
Wheat  1.6  5.0  3.5  7.7 
Corn  0.2  2.7  6.6  10.3 
Soybeans  -5.4  -4.9  6.6  8.1 
Rice  6.6  13.2  427.4  383.0 
Sugar  29.1  33.4  140.7  130.1 
Dairy  20.0  25.5  495.6  411.4 
Beef  12.9  14.7  308.9  266.6 
Poultry  4.9  7.2  13.6  22.7 
Table  2--Changes  in the Value of Trade  and  Exchange  Rates 
AGRICULTURE 
Case  1  Case  2 
-4  0 
-66  -56 
-35  -37 
-16  -12 
70  74 
28  66 
-828  -188 
219  109 
(percent  change) 
NONAGRICULTURE 
Case  1  Case  2 
0  0 
0  390 
0  13 
0  44 
0  -186 
0  -136 
0  4 
0  --15 
TOTAL 
Case  1  Case  2 
0  -1 
-89  0 
-19  0 
-14  0 
121  0 
21  0 
-19  0 
29  0 
A minus  sign represents depreciation relative to  the dollar. 
Table  3--Changes  in Economic  Well  Being:  GNP  1/ 
(percent  change) 
AGRICULTURE  NONAGRICULTURE  TOTAL 
Case  1  Case  2  Case  1  Case  2  Case  1  Case  2 
4  6  0  2  0  2 
-3  5  1  7  0  7 
-6  -2  0  5  0  5 
1  4  0  6  0  5 
20  25  -1  5  3  9 
5  20  0  10  1  12 
0  18  1  15  1  16 
10  7  0  0  1  0 
9 
Exchange  Rate 







4.9 product gains  or losses resulting from  liberalization.  Domestic product is 
computed  by multiplying world prices  (in local  currency terms)  times 
quantities supplied. 
In both scenarios,  world prices of all agricultural goods  except soybeans 
rise.  Sugar prices  increase the most  (29  percent  in scenario 1  and  33  percent 
in scenario 2),  followed  by dairy prices  (20  percent in scenario 1  and  26 
percent in scenario  2),  reflecting the relatively high levels of protection in 
these commodity markets.  (Note,  though,  that the new  domestic prices of the 
goods  may  be  lower  than initial domestic prices which  included the trade 
barriers.)  Soybean prices decline because of  the increased Argentine  and 
Brazilian exports  following  the removal  of producer taxes  and  consumer 
subsidies  in these two  countries  (Krissoff  and  Bal~enger,  1987).  The price 
increases  and  volume  expansion combine  to produce  an unambiguous  rise in the 
value of world agricultural trade. 
The  effects on  world prices are similar in the  two  scenarios,  but total 
liberalization,  and  the resulting exchange  rate movements,  tend  to reinforce 
the price effects of  liberalization confined to  the agricultural sector.  The 
largest difference  in price changes  is in the rice market.  This is driven by 
an appreciation in ROW's  currency which reduces  ROW's  willingness to export 
rice at the lower domestic price  (in comparison to the fixed  exchange rate 
case).  The  exchange  rate effect,  coupled with the elimination of the very 
high level of protection of  Japanese rice,  places additional upward pressure 
on world  rice price.  Soybean  prices also differ significantly between the 
two  scenarios.  The  depreciations  of  the Brazilian and  Argentine  currencies, 
in the  second case,  reinforce the export-stimulating effect of  removing  these 
countries'  soybean producer taxes. 
10 In both scenarios there are substantial changes  in foreign  exchange  earnings 
or costs  from agricultural trade following  liberalization (table 2).  In the 
total liberalization scenario,  Argentina and Brazil post gains  of  74  and  66 
percent,  respectively,  as  the volume  of  soybeans,  sugar,  dairy,  and  beef 
exports  expand by  a  minimum  of  40  percent.  For Brazil particularly,  this gain 
in agricultural export revenues  is significantly larger than  in the 
agricultural trade liberalization case.  In these two  countries,  protection of 
the nonagricultural sector has  generally represented  a  strong bias against 
agricultural exports. 
Table  2  also  shows  that Japan and  Mexico  purchase considerably more  foreign 
agricultural  goods  following  the removal  of high protection of  agriculture, 
particularly dairy for Mexico  and  rice,  sugar,  dairy,  and  beef  for  Japan. 
When  currency values  vary,  the Mexican peso  depreciates  11 percent and net 
expenditures  on  agricultural  imports  are much  smaller than in the fixed 
exchange  rate case.  Moreover,  Mexico  registers  a  140  percent rise in foreign 
exchange earnings  from  the "other agricultural"  good  (such as  tomatoes  and 
fresh vegetables)  over the base period  and  becomes  a  net exporter of  sugar. 
Case  1  results  in a  66  percent increase  in EC  expenditures  on agricultural 
imports,  with sugar,  dairy,  beef,  and poultry  becoming  imported  goods  while 
wheat  remains  as  an export  commodity.  Imports  of the "other agricultural" 
good,  however, 'continue to  account for more  than half of  foreign 
expenditures.  Case  2  results in depreciation of  the  EC  currency  (4  percent) 
which mitigates  somewhat  the negative effects of  agricultural liberalization 
on the Community's  agricultural trade balance. 
11 For the United states and  Canada,  the model  generates  decreases  in net 
agricultural exports  of  4  and  16  percent,  respectively,  in case 1  and  a 
marginal  increase and  a  12 percent decrease,  respectively,  in case  2.  In 
addition to  removing  the producer and  consumer  subsidy  (tax)  equivalents for 
specific U.s.  agricultural commodities,  we  exogenously shifted wheat,  corn, 
and  rice supply to account  for removal  of  acreage  reduction programs.  (The 
Canadian  figures,  however,  were not adjusted to  account  for  domestic  supply 
management  systems  that control production of dairy;  the decline in Canadian 
agricultural exports  may  be  substantially overstated.  If we  exclude dairy and 
its export deterioration,  Canadian agricultural exports  rise by  approximately 
3  percent.)  In both scenarios,  U.s.  net export values  of wheat,  beef,  and 
poultry increase,  soybean exports fall,  and  sugar and dairy net  import values 
increase. 
ROW  improves  its net export position in all agricultural goods  except  soybeans 
and  "other agriculture".  This  is not surprising since we  assumed  that ROW, 
on  net,  has  no  trade barriers.  with agricultural prices generally rising and 
perfect price transmission assumed,  ROW  increases its agricultural production 
and  decreases  its consumption.  The  improved net trade position of  ROW,  which 
is biased because of  the  lack of protection measures,  enhances  any decline or 
diminishes  any  improvement  in other countries'  commodity  trade balances.  In 
the total liberalization case,  appreciation of  ROW's  currency causes its 
exports  to be higher priced in dollar terms  and,  therefore,  mitigates  some  of 
the bias. 
In countries  which originally had  low or negative protection rates, 
agricultural liberalization (case 1)  produces  increases  in agricultural 




" Argentina and Brazil,  in particular:  the values  of  their agricultural output 
(including "other agriculture")  increases  20  and  5  percent,  respectively, 
leading  to  3  and  1  percent increases  in total domestic products. 
Much  larger increases in total domestic product occur  in the flexible  exchange 
rate case.  The  appreciation of  the dollar and  ROW's  currency relative to 
other countries'  currencies  and  the general  income  increases  due  to  complete 
trade liberalization lead to  an  expansion of  total excess  demand  for both 
agriculture and nonagriculture.  We  observe  domestic product  increases, 
especially for Brazil  (12  percent)  and  Mexico  (16  percent).  In the EC, 
agricultural and nonagricultural product both rise  (5  and  7  percent, 
respectively).  Japan's total  GDP  increases  by 5  percent despite a  decline in 
agricultural GDP. 
IV.  Conclusion 
This paper  compares  the effects of  liberalizing the agricultural sector with 
liberalizing agricultural  and nonagricultural sectors under  flexible  exchange 
rates.  In the  second case,  there are  two  additional factors that can 
influence agricultural markets,  namely  any  cross price effects  from price 
changes  in the nonagricultural markets  and  changes  in exchanges  rates  (which 
occur due  to  changes  in trade balances).  In this model  the cross price 
elasticities between agricultural and nonagricultural sectors are very small 
and  therefore there are  only  small effects resulting from this  linkage.  Since 
we  were  only able to provide very  rough estimates  for these elasticities,  this 
becomes  a  fruitful area for  further research.  The  second  channel  of 
influence--exchange rate movements--does  have significant effects  on  the 
agricultural sector as  well as  on  the general  economies.  Moreover,  the  income 
13 effects of  complete  liberalization are greater than those associated with 
agricultural liberalization,  especially for the industrialized economies. 
Some  of our main  findings  are: 
1.  Simultaneous  reductions  in agricultural and nonagricultural protection, 
allowing  exchange  rates to vary,  tend  to reinforce the upward  pressure on 
agricultural prices that follows  from  agricultural liberalization.  In 
most  commodity markets,  the reinforcing price effect occurs because the 
United States  and  rest-of-world currencies appreciate relative to the 
other countries.  These  two  regions  account  for  70  percent of  world  GOP. 
The  appreciation of their currencies  and  the resulting contraction of 
their net export volumes  put upward  pressure on world prices. 
2.  For several countries--those that experience the  largest exchange rate 
movements  following  trade liberalization such as  Argentina and Brazil 
--the two  simulations produce significantly different effects on 
agricultural trade values.  The  net agricultural export positions of 
Argentina and Brazil are favored  by  currency depreciations;  while the 
negative effects of  reducing agricultural protection on Mexican  and  EC 
agricultural trade balances are mitigated by their currency depreciations. 
3.  Total gross  domestic product  increases more  for all countries  (except 
ROW)  in the total liberalization case than in the agricultural 
liberalization case.  Total  GOP  and  agricultural product benefit from the 
currency depreciations experienced by most  countries  because  domestic 
production is valued  in domestic  currency at higher prices before 
liberalization.  Higher world  (dollar)  prices  and  higher levels  of  income 
also translates  into higher levels  of  GOP. 
This  paper illustrates the value of  a  broader approach to  analyzing 
agricultural trade liberalization issues.  SUbstantial differences  for 
individual countries  arise when  results of  the total liberalization scenario 
are  compared  with the results of  the agricultural liberalization scenario. 
This model  indicates,  however,  that these differences are smaller for  the 
united States  than those that could arise for other countries,  particularly 
developing  countries where  the protection of the nonagricultural sector 
remains  relatively high.  OUr  analysis is limited by its high level of 
aggregation,  the  lack of  information on protection for ROW,  and  its 
consideration of  a  narrow set of macroeconomic  factors.  Additional  studies 
may  want  to  consider changes  in other macroeconomic policies concomitant with 
trade liberalization. 
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15 APPENDIX 
Derivation of  Reduced  Form  Equations 
To  determine the  impact  of  small  changes  in the system for  a  single 
country,  ego  unilateral changes  in protection,  text equations  (1)  through  (11) 
and  (13)  are differentiated.  One  agricultural  good  is assumed  for purposes  of 
exposition.  Also,  the country demarcation  i  is initially dropped  for 
notational ease.  The  superscript *  indicates percentage changes. 
DA*  = m PA*  +  mTPT*  +  ~PH* +  Inyy*  A 
DT*  = n  PA*  +  nTPT*  +  ~PH* +  ~y*  A 
DH*  = r  PA*  +  rTPT*  +  rHPH*  +  r  y*  A  Y 
SA*  = e  PA*  +  eTPT*  +  e  PH*  A  H 
ST*  = f  PA*  +  fTPT*  +  fHPH*  A 
SH*  = g  PA*  +  gTPT*  +  gHPH*  A 
where  the m's, n's and r's represent demand  elasticities and e's, 
f's and g's represent supply elasticities with respect to domestic 
prices  and  income.  Differentiation of equations  (1)  and  (12),  yield 
y*  = VA(DA*  +  PA*)  +  VTCDT*  +  PT*)  +  VHCDH*  +  PH*)~ 
PT*  = E*  +  PWT*  +  (1  +  tT)* 
and 
PA*  = E*  +  PWA*  +  (1  +  tA)* 
where  the V's  are expenditure shares,  VA  = PADA, 
Y 
VT  = PTDT,  and  VH  = PHDH  and  where  we  distinquish the nonagricultural 
Y  Y 










(A9)  .' By  substituting for y*  from  equation  (A7)  into  the  demand  equations,  we  can 
eliminate  income  from  (Al),  (A2)  and  (A3): 
DA*  = aAPA*  +  aTPT*  +  aHPH* 
DT*  = bAPA*  +  bTPT*  +  bHPH* 
DH*  = cAPA*  +  CTPT*  +  cHPH* 
where  a,  b,  and  c  are parameters  comprising price and  income 




To  determine  changes  in price of  the home  good,  we  substitute equations  (A6), 
*  *  (AS),  (A9),  and  (A12)  into the differentiated equation  (7),  SH  - DH  = 0, 
PH*  = -[(cA - gA)J(cH - gH)]  [E*  +  PWA*  +  (1  +  tA)*l 
-fCc  - g  )J(c  - ~_)]  [E*  +  PWT*  +  (1  +  tT)*]  T  T  H  -H  (A13) 
The  home  good price,  therefore,  is influenced by  changes  in the exchange rate, 
trade policy,  and  world prices of  agricultural and nonagricultural goods. 
More  specifically,  if the difference between  [(cA - gA)  and  (cT  - gT)] 
are positive,  then a  depreciation of  the home  currency,  an  increase in world 
prices,  or an  increase in protection would place upward pressure on the price 
of the home  good.  The  next step is to differentiate the net trade equation 
(9): 
8l(SA*  +  PA*)  .- 82(DA*  +  PA*)  + 83(ST*  +  PT*)  - 84(DT*  + PT*) 
=  F*  (A14) 
17 where 91  (92)  is the share of  the value of  supply  (demand)  for agriculture 
and  93  (94)  is the share of  supply  (demand)  for nonagriculture relative to 
the value of net trade.  By  substituting from  equations  (A4),  (AS),  (A8)  -
(All)  and  (A13)  into  (A14),  we  obtain an expression for  changes  in balance of 
trade in terms  of  changes  in trade and  exchange rate policies,  and  changes  in 
world prices  of both agricultural and nonagricultural traded goods  (equation 
14  in text): 
(IT1  +  IT2)E*  +  IT1[PWA*  +  (1  +  tA)*l  +  IT2[PWT*  +  (1  +  tT)*l  = F* 
where 
ITI  = 91(1+eA)  - 92(1+aA)  + 93fA- 94bA-[(cA-gA)/(cH - gT)l 
[91eH - 92aH + 93fH - 94bHl 
and 
IT2  = 91eT  - 92aT  +  93(1+fT)  - 94(1+bT)  - [(cT-gT)/(cH-~)l 
[91eH - 92aH + 93fH - 94bHl 
(A1S) 
Next,  we  relax the  assumption  of  a  representative country and,  instead,  we 
assume  there are  two  countries  and  three goods  (an agricultural good,  a  non-
agricultural good,  and  a  nontraded  good).  The  following equations  illustrate 
the implications of bilateral changes  of protection in this  framework. 
For countries 1  and  2: 
(ITll  +  IT12)E1*  +  ITll(PWA*  +  (1  +  tAl)*)  +  IT12(PWT*  + 
(1  +  tTl)*)  = Fl* 
(IT21  +  IT22)E2*  +  IT21(PWA*  +  (1  +  tA2)*)  +  IT22(PWT*  + 
(1  +  tT2)*)  = F2* 
(A16) 
(A17) 
Again,  we  can examine  the two  extreme possibilities:  allowing  capital flows  to 
change or allowing  the  exchange  rate to float.  In the  fixed  exchange rate 
case,  with F1*  +  F2*  =  0  by  definition,  equations  (A16  and  A17)  reduce  to: 
18 1/2 [fill ..  Il12)PWA*  +  (Il21  - Il22)PWT*  +  1111(1  +  tA1)* 
- 1112(1  +  tA2)*  +  1121(1  +  tT1)*  - 1122(1  +  tT2)*]  = F1*  (A18) 
If country 1  liberalizes relatively more  than country 2,  assuming  no  changes 
in world price,  then  country 1  experiences  a  deterioration of  the trade 
balance  and,  consequently,  requires  larger capital inflows.  In the floating 
exchange rate case,  with E2*  = - (1/E1E2)E1*  by definition,  equations  (A16  and 
A17)  reduce to: 
-1/f[Il11  - Il12)PWA*  +  (1121  - Il22)PWT*  +  Il11(1+tA1)* 
.- 1112(1  +  tA2)*  +  1121(1  +  tT1)*  - 1122(1  +  tT1)*]  = E1*  (A19) 
where  f1  = 1111  +  1112  +  (1/E1E2)(TI21  +  1122).  Again,  if country 1 
liberalizes relatively more  than  country 2,  assuming no  changes  in world 
prices,  then  country 1  experiences  a  depreciation of its currency relative to 
country 2's. 
In equations  (A18)  and  (A19)  there are three unknown  variables:  changes  in 
world prices of agricultural goods,  changes  in world prices of nonagricultural 
goods,  and  changes  in the trade balance or exchange rate.  To  complete  the 
system,  the market  clearing conditions  (equations  (10)  and  (11»  need  to  be 
differentiated: 
SA1SA1*  +  SA2SA2*  - DA1DA1*  - DA2DA2*  = 0 
and 
ST1ST1*  +  ST2ST2*  - DT1DT1*  - DT2DT2*  = 0 
Substituting equations  (A4) ,  (A8)  - (10)  and  (A13),  into  equation  (A20) 
and  equations  (AS),  (A8) , _ (A9),  (All)  and  (A13)  into equation  (A21)  yield 
f2El*  +  (~11 +  ~12)PWA* +  (~21 +  ~22)PWT* +  ~11(1 +tA1)* 





f3EI*  +  (tIl +  tI2)PWA*  +  (t21  +  t22)PWT*  +  t11(1  +  tAI)* 
+  t21(1  +  tAI)*  +  t12(1  +  tTI)*  +  t22(1+ tT2)*  =  0 
where 
f2  =  ~ll +  ~12 - (1/EIE2)(~21 +  ~22), 
f3  = tIl +  tl2 - (1/EIE2)(t21  +  t22), 
(A23) 
~ll= SAI(eAI  - eHI(cAI  - gAI)/(cHI  - ~l»  - DAI(aAI  - aHI(cA1  - gA1)/(cH1  - gHI», 
~12= SAI(eTI  - eHI(cT1  - gTI)/(cHI  - ~l»  - DAI(aT1  - aH1(cT1  - gT1)/(cHI  - gHI»' 
~21= SA2(eA2  - eH2 (cA2  - gA2)/(cH2  - gH2»  - DA2(aA2  - aH2 (cA2  - gA2)/(CH2  - gH2»' 
~22= SA2(eT2  - eH2 (cT2  - gT2)/(cH2  - gH2»  - DA2(aT2  - aH2(cT2  - gT2)/(cH2  - ~2» 
tl1= ST1(fAI  - fH1(cA1  - gA1)/(cH1  - gHI»  - DTI(bAI  - bH1(cA1  - gAI)/(cHI  - ~l»' 
t12=  ST1(fT1  - fHI(cT1  - gT1)/(cH1  - ~1»  - DT1(bTI  - bH1(cTI  - gT1)/(cHI  - gHI», 
t21=  ST2(fA2  - fH2(cA2  - gA2)/(cH2  - ~2»  - DT2(bA2  - bH2 (cA2  - gA2)/(cH2  - ~2»' 
t22=  ST2(fT2  - fH2 (cT2  - gT2)/(cH2  - gH2»  - DT2(bT2  - bH2 (cT2  - gT2)/(cH2  - ~2»· 
Under  the  assumption of  floating  exchange rates,  reduced  form equations  can be 
calculated  from equations  (AI9) ,  (A22) ,  and  (A23): 
EI*  = wl(l  +  tA1)*  +  w2(1  +  tA2)*  +  w3(1  +  tT1)*  +  w4 
(1  +  tT2)*  (A24) 
PWA*  =  w5(1  +  tA1)*  +  w6(1  +  tA2)*  +  w7(1  +  tT1)*  +  w8 
(1  +  tT2)*  (A25) 
PWT*  = w9(1  +  tA1)*  +  w10(1  +  tA2)*  +  w11(1  +  tT1)* 
+  w12  (1  +  tT2)*  (A26) 
where  w's  are the reduced  form parameters.  Changes  in the exchange rate, 
the world prices of agricultural goods,  and  the world prices of non-
agricultural goods  depend  on  the  exogenous  changes  in protection.  w1, 
20 
,I w3,  w5,  w6,  w11,  and  w12  are expected  to be negative,  while 
w2,  w4,  w7,  w8,  w9,  and  w10  are expected to be positive.  Reducing 
protection relatively more  in country 1  than  in country  2  should  cause  a 
decline in the value of  country l's currency relative to  country 2's and 
should have  a  positive effect on world prices. 
Data Sources 
Three  types  of  data are needed  to  develop  the empirical model:  (1)  base  year 
data,  including quantities supplied,  demanded,  and  traded,  prices,  and 
exchange rates for 1984;  (2)  elasticities,  including  own- and  cross-price 
elasticities of  supply and  demand  for agricultural  and nonagricultural 
composite  goods;  and  (3)  measures  of protection for agricultural and 
nonagricultural  goods. 
Base  year data for agricultural supply and  demand  were  obtained  from  the 
Foreign  Agricu~tural Service,  USDA,  supply and utilization data base.  Country 
GDP  data,  used to calculate other agricultural supplies and nonagricultural 
supplies  (traded  and nontraded),  were  obtained  from united Nations  Monthly 
Statistics  (Special Table I,  Gross  domestic product and net material product 
by kind of  economic activity),  Eurostat Review  (National accounts,  gross  value 
added at current market prices),  and  International Financial Statistics, 
International Monetary Fund.  Trade  flow figures  were obtained  from 
International Trade 1985-86,  published by  the GATT,  Food  and Agricultural 
Organization's Trade Yearbook,  and,  for Latin American  countries,  from  country 
statistical trade yearbooks.  Net  trade for  each good  was  subtracted  from 
supply in order to obtain demand.  In cases where  1984  data were unavailable, 
estimates were made  based  on  the latest information available. 
21 Elasticities were  obtained  from  several  sources.  Price elasticities for 
agricultural commodities  were  compiled,  based  on estimates  from  a  number  of 
existing studies,  by  the  Economic  Research Service  (ERS),  USDA,  for the 
purposes  of its agricultural trade liberalization modeling  work.  Elasticities 
for nonagricultural goods  were obtained  from Deardorff and  Stern  (1986)  or 
were  estimated by  applying  the homogeneity conditions  to  the equations.  All 
the elasticities should be  considered medium  term estimates,  that is,  three to 
five years. 
Ad  valorem equivalent rates of protection for nonagricultural traded goods 
were  obtained  from Whalley  for developed  countries  and  from  the  IMF  for the 
Latin American  countries.  Agricultural protection rates,  producer and 
consumer  subsidy equivalents  (PSE's  and  eSE's),  were  developed  by  USDA.  These 
measures  include estimates of the subsidy equivalents  of domestic  agricultur~l 
policies,  such as direct payments  and  input subsidies,  as  well  as  the effects 
of  trade barriers  (USDA).  Where  agricultural PSE's  and  eSE's  were 
unavailable,  estimates  of  agricultural  commodity protection were  obtained  from 
Tyers  and  Anderson  (1986). 
22 